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Abstract  
The economic crisis that started in 2008 has negatively affected European nations to 
different degrees. The sudden rise in demonstrations particularly in those countries most 
hard hit by the crisis suggests that grievance theories, dismissed in favour of resource-based 
models since the 1970s, might have a role to play for explaining protest behaviour. While 
most previous studies have tested these theories at the individual or contextual level, it is 
likely that mechanisms at both levels are interrelated. To fill this lacuna, we examine the 
ways in which individual-level grievances interact with macro-level factors to impact on 
protest behaviour. In particular, we examine whether the impact of individual subjective 
feelings of deprivation is conditional on contextual macroeconomic and policy factors. We 
find that while individual-level relative deprivation has a direct effect on the propensity to 
have protested in the last year, this effect is greater under certain macroeconomic and 
political conditions. We interpret both significant results for the cross-level interactions in 
terms of their role for opening up political opportunities for protest amongst those who felt 
they had been most deprived in the current crisis. These findings suggest that the 
interaction of the contextual and individual level should continue to be explored in future 
studies in order to further clarify the mechanisms underlying protest behaviour.  
 
 
Keywords: protest, participation, relative deprivation, macroeconomic context, political 
opportunity structure 
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Introduction  
The economic crisis that started in 2008 has led to growing unemployment and shrinking 
economic growth across Europe and the rest of the world (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013).  
Almost ten years on, there is great variation in the economic conditions of different 
European nations. Particularly in those countries worst hit by economic recession large 
protests took place as European governments were blamed for the deteriorating conditions 
(Rüdig and Karyotis, 2013, Giugni and Grasso, 2015a, Grasso and Giugni, 2016, Grasso 
and Giugni, 2013). All these observations raise important questions with respect to the 
relationship between protest behaviour and micro- and macro-level deprivation. They also 
motivate an interrogation of the nature of the link with a perceived imbalance between 
expected standards of living and the realities of current economic conditions as a result of 
the economic crisis. 
The literature on social movements has been split between those emphasising the 
importance of resources for political involvement and those instead seeing grievances as an 
important spur for action. Since the 1970s, objective material conditions and deprivation 
have largely been dismissed as explanations for political action (Useem, 1998, Buechler, 
2004). Earlier scholars such as Smelser (1962), Gurr (1970) and to some extent Piven and 
Cloward (1977) had seen negative material conditions, expressed in grievances, as the 
precondition spurring individuals to contentious political action. However, the main strands 
of research on mobilisation emerging since then, including ‘resource mobilization theory’ 
(RMT) (e.g. McCarthy and Zald, 1973), political process (e.g. Tilly, 1978, McAdam, 1982, 
Kriesi et al., 1995), and new social movement theory (Touraine, 1981, e.g. Melucci, 1989) 
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have viewed material hardship as largely unimportant or only relevant to the extent that 
social movements could frame it in ways to mobilise action.  
The sudden rise of protest movements during the recent economic crisis has brought 
to the fore once more the question of whether grievance theories may play a role for 
explaining collective action. A number of scholars have started to re-examine the impact of 
grievances on protest behaviour (e.g. Rüdig and Karyotis, 2013, Bernburg, 2015). 
However, most studies only examine the effect of these factors on mobilisation from either 
an individual or a macro-level perspective, but do not consider the interaction of individual 
and contextual level factors (Kern et al. (2015) is a recent exception, but here change in 
economic conditions is examined and the focus is not protest specifically). To address this 
gap in the literature, we examine the interplay of micro-level grievances and macro-level 
factors for protest behaviour. In particular, we argue that the extent of the effect of 
individual deprivation on protest is conditional upon the presence of contextual 
macroeconomic and policy factors which broaden out perceived political opportunities.   
The high levels of variation in the current economic contexts of European nations 
and the differences in policy responses across national governments provide an excellent 
test case for investigating these macro-micro interactions. While subjective perceptions of 
relative deprivation have been shown to be important for mobilisation to contentious 
political action (Klandermans et al., 2008), we argue that individuals also take cues from 
the general economic environment and that state policies will also have an impact on 
mobilisation (see Giugni and Grasso, 2015b for e.g. in relation to the environmental 
movement). We theorise that the impact of feelings of relative deprivation on engagement 
in protest activities is moderated by macroeconomic and political contextual factors 
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(Giugni and Grasso, 2016). To investigate this proposition we analyse data from an original 
cross-national survey conducted in 2015 in the context of the Living with Hard Times 
(LIVEWHAT) project [grant agreement number 613237] coordinated by the University of 
Geneva (Marco Giugni) funded by the European Commission under the auspices of the 7th 
Framework Programme (Giugni et al., 2013). We specify random effects models with 
cross-level interactions and show that micro-level deprivation interacts with contextual 
factors to spur protest behaviour.  In what follows first we review previous research, then 
detail data and methods, present our results and finally discuss their wider implications for 
the discipline and for protest in times of crisis.  
 
Previous research  
As citizens struggle to cope with the negative effects of the economic crisis, attention has 
been drawn to related issues of fairness and the distribution of resources in society. Recent 
years have seen a growth in studies on inequality (Nolan and Whelan, 2011, Musterd and 
Ostendorf, 2013, Dorling, 2014, Piketty, 2014, Atkinson, 2015). While less has been 
written on the political ramifications of these developments, some social movement 
scholars have recently sought to “bring capitalism back” into studies of protest (Della Porta, 
2015). With the economic crisis still unfolding and growing inequality across the globe, it 
is time to re-examine the debate in political science, sociology and social movement studies 
over whether deprivation leads to an increase or a decrease in protest participation.  
Grievance theories see material deprivation as instrumental to social movement 
mobilisation (Useem 1998; Buechler 2004). Various feelings such as psychological strain, 
alienation and other negative emotions are understood to emerge from it, leading people to 
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challenge the political order (Opp, 1988). Kornhauser’s (1959) mass society theory 
emphasized concerns over anomie and egoism present in Durkheim’s classic work and 
suggested that the breakdown of mid-level groups and social anchors would lead 
individuals to gravitate to collective behaviour as one of the only few available sources of 
social belonging in modernity. Smelser (1962) combined strain and breakdown theories 
focusing on dissolution of social cohesion during periods of change into a structural-
functionalist theory of collective behaviour. An important variant in the grievance tradition 
is relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970). Here the strain is understood at the individual 
level and pertains to comparisons either with some reference group or oneself against past 
or future selves (Buechler 2004). Relative deprivation theory in particular emphasises the 
gap between expectations and experienced reality (Geschwender, 1968, Davies, 1962). 
While stressing the primacy of perceptions of illegitimate deprivation, Thompson 
(1971) and Scott (1976) also saw a role for structural breakdown in explanations of protest. 
Piven and Cloward (1977) combined political factors and the stress of structural changes 
wrought by the Great Depression in their explanation of social unrest. While some elements 
of strain and breakdown theories persisted in these works and those of Useem (1980), 
Goldstone (1986), Goldstone (1991a), Goldstone (1991b), Snow et al. (1998), among 
others, a large number of scholars challenged grievance-related explanations as they did not 
seem particularly useful to make sense of the new social movements emerging since the 
1960-70s. For example, Tilly et al. (1975) emphasized group solidarity as the key factor 
explaining collective action. More generally, resource mobilization theory emphasized the 
rationality of social movements as following the patterns of more institutional types of 
action (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Since grievances 
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were understood as constant over time they were discounted as explanatory factors for 
mobilisation and the focus moved on to that which varied, i.e. resources (McCarthy and 
Zald, 1977). Individual level studies also supported resource-based accounts and education, 
occupation and income were seen as major drivers of participation (Verba et al., 1995). 
One of the clearest challenges to the idea that grievances led to protest came from 
political process theory (Tilly, 1978, McAdam, 1982). Political opportunity structures, 
central to this approach, were understood in terms of the institutional features of the 
political system and the set-up of the configurations of power relative to challengers such as 
social movements. Political process theory emphasised the importance of resources and 
political opportunities, but also the subjective dimension of protest and framing (Eisinger, 
1973, Kitschelt, 1986, Tarrow, 1994, McAdam, 1996, Kriesi, 2004, Meyer, 2004). The key 
insight was perhaps the suggestion that the subjective understanding of the status quo as 
something that could be challenged provided the rational basis for protest (McAdam, 1982). 
For example, McVeigh (2009) noted how declining power altered individuals’ perceptions 
of their circumstances and provided opportunities for constructing new mobilizing frames.   
 While the emphasis tends to be placed on the social construction of grievances as 
critical for protest (Klandermans et al., 2008), some prominent studies have noted how 
“objective” grievances can also be relevant (Snow et al., 1998, McVeigh, 2009). Snow et 
al.’s (1998) “disruption of the quotidian” framework emphasizes the role of interference 
with normal routines in the tradition of Piven and Cloward (1977). Disruptions could be 
nuclear disasters or threats to the neighbourhood. Deprivation that leads to changes in 
routines can become a quotidian disruption (Snow and Soule, 2009). Protest could result 
from deprivation without an equal decline in expectations (Thomassen, 1989).  
 9 
 
More recently, the economic crisis has spurred further studies of the impact of 
economic hardship on political participation. However, none of these studies looks 
specifically at the relationship between protest and relative deprivation, and most studies 
focus on just the individual or macro-level, failing to test for cross-level interactions 
between the two. Caren et al. (2011) use newspaper reports of contentious acts across 157 
countries during 1960-2001 and find a significant negative relation between contentious 
acts and economic growth. Laurence and Lim (2012) show that the economic crisis 
depressed volunteering in the US and UK (see also Clarke and Heath, 2014, Lim and 
Laurence, 2015). Using 2004 ISSP data Dodson (2015) finds evidence that the mobilizing 
effects of economic uncertainty are strongest among the most vulnerable. Kern et al. (2015) 
use ESS data for 2002-2010 and show a direct effect of unemployment change between 
2009 and 2010 on a scale measure of non-institutionalised participation. However, they find 
no significant cross-level interaction for “double-deprivation theory” (Foster and Matheson, 
1995:1168): the expectation that in countries particularly hit by the crisis “the personal 
becomes political” so that individuals who suffer become particularly motivated to action. 
In this paper we build on the idea from political process theory that grievances 
matter to the extent that they are socially constructed and subjectively perceived in order to 
develop our argument that deprivation felt by individuals in times of crisis will be more 
likely to lead to protest behaviour under certain contextual conditions, or political 
opportunities. Following Bermeo and Bartels (2014), we suggest that the policies 
implemented by national governments may also interact with individual-level relative 
deprivation to spur political action. This argument develops on political opportunity theory 
since policies are an important component of political opportunities (Meyer, 2004).  
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Our argument, we hope, also contributes to the literature by examining how 
economic and political factors configuring the political opportunity structures in turn 
interact with deprivation to enhance the protest potential of grievances. Case studies of 
marginalized groups such as the homeless (Snow et al., 2005), militias (Van Dyke and 
Soule, 2002), the KKK (McVeigh, 2009) or the unemployed (Giugni, 2008) , provide 
mixed support for the influence of economic threat on mobilisation. Research to date has 
examined how institutional structures allow for marginalized groups, such as the 
unemployed, opportunities to mobilize (Chabanet and Faniel, 2012, Giugni, 2008). Studies 
have shown that mobilisation of the unemployed is higher where cultural contexts support 
it and where elites are more open to these types of demands. Generally, contexts 
characterised by higher levels of social spending are contexts more encouraging of the 
protest of those who are relatively more deprived. Higher levels of social spending denote 
more social democratic political cultures where inequality and poverty are constructed as 
social and political problems. In turn, this leads individuals to understand their deprivation 
as susceptible to political solutions through political participation. On the other hand, 
liberal or neoliberal contexts tend to be characterised by more individualised 
understandings of poverty, thus depressing protest action. Taken together, these 
considerations contribute to the theoretical argument that we develop and test in this paper 
in keeping with the political opportunity approach which suggests that the effect of 
individual relative deprivation will be emphasised under certain contextual dynamics. 
To summarise, we expect that relative deprivation will spur engagement in protest 
activism to a greater extent where it occurs in concomitance with macro-level external 
conditions in terms of more open political opportunity structures. The former could be seen 
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to be reflected in high unemployment rates or slow economic growth, while the latter can 
be seen in particular in higher levels of social spending or higher rates of taxation. We 
understand these conditions to be conducive to the politicisation of individual deprivation, 
thus spurring political action to a greater degree than simply the direct effect. By 
developing and testing a theory on the interrelation between relative deprivation, 
macroeconomic context and political opportunity structures our research also heeds the 
calls to develop scholarship on micro-macro linkages for explaining protest (Opp, 2009).  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Data and methods  
We use data from an original cross-national survey (N=18,370) conducted in 2015 in the 
context of the Living with Hard Times (LIVEWHAT) project [grant agreement number 
613237] coordinated by the University of Geneva (Marco Giugni) funded by the European 
Commission under the auspices of their 7th Framework Programme (Giugni et al., 2013). 
The survey was conducted in each of the nine European countries included in the project: 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, by a 
specialised polling agency using online panels with the methodologies available in each 
country and quota balanced in order to match national population statistics in terms of 
region, sex, age, and education level. We also include macro-level data from 2014 from the 
World Bank on unemployment and GDP growth as well as from the OECD on government 
social spending and tax wedges. Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in 
Table 1. Once all missing values are removed the final sample is 17,667 (Ns for each 
country are reported in Table 2).  
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INSERT TABLE 2  
 
Our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable measuring whether someone had 
participated in protests in the last 12 months. Since studies have shown that protest 
participation has distinct features to other types of political action that could reasonably be 
classed in the “unconventional” realm  (Grasso, 2014, Grasso, 2016, Grasso, 2011) we do 
not create scales of activities but rather focus on this “modal” expression (Tarrow, 1996) of 
social movement activism, also as exemplified by the anti-austerity demonstrations taking 
place as a result of the crisis. Studies that construct scales for non-institutional participation 
(e.g.Kern et al., 2015) can be problematic, particularly at the cross-national level since they 
confound very different types of political action that are likely to have different 
relationships with deprivation. Additionally, some actions such as petitioning are extremely 
popular whereas other forms such as demonstrating are practiced by much smaller fractions 
of the population. Moreover, since we want to understand the impact of the economic 
context in 2014 on participation in 2015, we limited the indicator to participation in the last 
year. Table 2 shows the proportion of individuals that said they had demonstrated in the last 
twelve months in each country. As we can see, there is a reasonable degree of variation. 
Part of the variation appears to be related to the severity and extent of the crisis. Countries 
where the crisis had deeper effects such as Greece saw greater levels of protest. 
 The key independent variable for subjective feelings of relative deprivation is 
retrospective to the last five years so that the deterioration of conditions relative to 
expectations should have at least begun to occur prior to protest participation in the last 12 
months and as such the time-ordering of independent and dependent variables respects the 
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requirements of causality. This question asks respondents whether they felt that the 
economic situation of their household was much better or much worse than it was five 
years ago. We dichotomise this measure following previous research (Rüdig and Karyotis, 
2013) in a dummy for whether individuals felt the economic situation of their household 
had become worse. Table 2 also shows the proportion of individuals who said the economic 
situation had become worse in each country. Here too, there is a good amount of variation. 
Our key macroeconomic variables aim to examine both negative and positive 
indicators of economic context. On the one hand, high unemployment levels are perhaps 
the most pernicious consequence of the current economic crisis in Europe. Countries such 
as Greece and Spain, where unemployment is highest, are those that in general have 
suffered the most from the current economic crisis. On the other hand, we also examine 
GDP growth as this is perhaps the clearest measure that a country is doing well and is 
coming out of recession. Both variables are taken for 2014 in order to examine conditions 
prior to participation but not too far back in time. 
On the policy side, we include two measures: the government expenses for social 
policies (as a percentage of the GDP) and the tax wedge (as a percentage of labour cost). 
These two variables reflect also a definition of austerity policies as reducing government 
spending, especially in the social realm, and increasing taxation, especially on labour. Most 
importantly for our present purpose, they are meant to capture the output side of political 
opportunity structures. Again, both variables are taken for 2014. 
We also include in our models the usual socio-demographic controls (Grasso et al., 
2016, Grasso, 2013, Dunn et al., 2014, Saunders et al., 2012): age, gender, education level 
(low), occupation (manual) and employment status (whether the respondent is 
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unemployed). We also include a number of controls for political attitudes and resources: 
political interest, internal and external political efficacy, left-right values, libertarian-
authoritarian values, and number of organisational memberships (distributions by country 
for all dependent and independent variables are provided in Table 2).   
Our dependent variable is measured at the individual level but we have independent 
variables at both the individual and the country level. Moreover, we are interested in the 
interactions between these two levels since our argument refers to differences in how 
individual subjective feelings of deprivation relate to individuals’ protest behaviour 
according to country-level economic and political context. For this reason, we specify 
multilevel models with random intercept coefficients to take into account the two-level 
nature of the data (country and individual). This model is useful to correct for the within-
country dependence of observations (intraclass correlation) and adjusts both within and 
between parameter estimates in relation to the clustered nature of the data (Snijders and 
Bosker, 1999). Since our dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate logistic 
multilevel models with a Gaussian link function.  
 
Findings 
We specify ten models reported in Table 3: Model 1 is the empty model; Model 2 includes 
the key individual-level independent variable measuring relative deprivation and only the 
individual-level control variables; Model 3 includes the first macro-level indicator, 
unemployment rate in 2014; Model 4 GDP growth in 2014; Model 5 social spending in 
2014; Model 6 tax wedge in 2014. Models 7-10 include, in turn, each of the four macro-
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level variables from Models 3-6 and the relevant cross-level interaction with individual 
relative deprivation.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Model fit improves with the inclusion of the individual level variables as signalled 
by the reduction in Log Likelihood. There is also an improvement with the inclusion of the 
macro-level factors and their cross-level interactions with relative deprivation, particularly 
unemployment in Model 3 and Model 7. Across Models 1-6 (Models 7-10 include cross-
level interactions) relative deprivation has a positive effect on protest participation. Model 
2 including all the individual level controls shows that there is no significant effect of low 
education level or having a manual occupation1 on participation. However, being 
unemployed has a negative and significant effect across models. In other words, at the 
individual level there is very little evidence for grievance theory: being unemployed 
reduces chances of demonstrating (this also goes against the predictions of biographical 
availability in some specifications). Also in line with the resources/SES and civic 
voluntarism model (Verba et al. 1995), having a greater political interest, having stronger 
internal and external efficacy (the direction of the items in the scale is negative so the effect 
of external efficacy is also positive), being more left-wing (relative to right-wing) and also 
being more libertarian (relative to more authoritarian) all have a significant and positive 
effect on protest; as expected, organisational membership also has a strong positive effect.  
                                                             
1
 As a check, we also ran a separate model (not shown here) with just the basic socio-demographic controls of 
age, gender, education (low), occupation (manual) and employment status (unemployed). Here we see a 
negative effect of low education -0.29 (S.E. 0.06) *** which disappears once political interest is included in 
the model with all individual level controls (Model 2, as presented); the effects of occupation (no significant 
effect) and unemployed (negative and significant effect) were instead largely equivalent to Model 2.  
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What happens when we consider the macro-level economic factors? When the first 
contextual variable, unemployment, is included in Model 3, we can see that there is a 
positive and significant effect of this macroeconomic context variable on demonstrating. 
Individuals in countries with higher unemployment are more likely to have engaged in 
protests in the last 12 months. At first glance, this provides some evidence for grievance 
theory: at the macro-level, countries with worse economic conditions are more likely to 
experience protest. However, the inclusion of this macro-level variable in Model 3 does not 
remove the individual-level effect of relative deprivation found previously. Subjective 
feelings of relative deprivation still have an impact regardless of whether individuals are 
living in countries with high or low unemployment levels. This suggests that individuals 
examine their own household situation with respect to their expectations of where they 
should have been and this mechanism operates independently of wider comparisons.  
When GDP growth is included in Model 4, there is a negative and significant direct 
effect of this economic context variable on protest. Individuals in countries with lower GDP 
growth are more likely to have engaged in protests in the last 12 months. Again, this might 
be seen as providing evidence for grievance theory: at the macro-level, countries with lower 
levels of economic growth are more likely to experience protest. However, the inclusion of 
this macro-level variable in Model 4 does not remove the individual-level effects found 
previously. Subjective feelings of relative deprivation still have an impact regardless of 
whether individuals are living in countries with high or low GDP growth. Once more, this 
supports the idea that individuals primarily examine their own household situation with 
respect to their expectations of where they should have been and that wider comparisons do 
not explain away the effect of subjective feelings of relative deprivation.  
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Turning to macro-level political factors, we observe a similar pattern as for the 
economic context. When social spending is included in Model 5, this has a positive effect 
on demonstration activities. We interpret this as signalling more open political opportunity 
structures. Again, the inclusion of this macro-level political factor does not erode the effect 
of relative deprivation, meaning that the latter still has an impact regardless of whether 
individuals are living in countries with diverse levels of spending.  
 When including tax wedge in Model 6 there is a small but significant (at the 10 
percent level) effect: the greater the tax wedge, the greater the protest. This is in line with 
Bermeo and Bartels’ (2014) hypothesis that people react to austerity policies rather than 
directly to the negative effects of the economic crisis. At the same time, however, the 
inclusion of this macro-level factor once again does not change the effect of relative 
deprivation. In other words, the latter plays a role net of this measure. 
The main goal of this research, developing on previous work in the literature, was to 
combine the individual and macro-level perspectives on protest mobilisation in times of 
crisis. To extend this framework, Models 7-10 include cross-level interactions between 
each of our macro-level variables and relative deprivation at the individual level in turn. 
Our results, as presented in Model 7, show that in countries with higher unemployment 
rates, the effect of feelings of relative deprivation on participation is increased. This means 
that individuals who feel that their household conditions have deteriorated in the last five 
years in Greece or Spain are more likely to protest than individuals who have the same 
feelings in Germany or Switzerland. This suggests that individual-level subjective 
perceptions of relative deprivation are amplified by the wider national economic context. 
Individuals feeling that their conditions have deteriorated in the last five years in Greece or 
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Spain are likely to have experienced worse deterioration than individuals in countries such 
as Germany and Switzerland that have had less negative experiences of the recent 
economic crisis. These results thus show that while deprivation at the individual level has a 
positive effect on protest participation regardless of the economic context, at higher levels 
of unemployment the effect of deprivation is magnified relative to contexts with lower 
unemployment. In turn, this suggests that this type of contextual fact may serve to politicise 
individual deprivation, as we discuss in more detail in the final section.  
We find this conditional effect also for the political context in terms of the political 
opportunity structure offered by social democracies with more extensive welfare states. 
These results are shown in Model 9. In contrast, neither GDP growth (Model 8) nor tax 
wedge (Model 10), although they have a direct effect on protest participation, condition the 
effect of individual relative deprivation in this respect.   
Model 7 with one cross-level interaction for relative deprivation and unemployment 
showed that the coefficient for relative deprivation is -0.10 and not significant, which 
means that there is no difference between those who are relatively more or less deprived 
when the unemployment rate is 0. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
the interaction term between relative deprivation and unemployment (0.02) suggests that 
the gap between those who are relatively more or less deprived increases as unemployment 
goes up. For every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the gap in the log-
odds of protesting increases by 0.02. At what point do the relatively deprived start 
protesting at higher levels than those who do not feel deprived? These estimates suggest 
that the two groups start departing when unemployment reaches a level of 5% (i.e. -
0.10/0.02=-5), that is, quite low.  For social spending, in Model 10, the positive and 
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statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term between relative deprivation and 
social spending (0.03) suggests that the gap in protesting between those who are relatively 
more or less deprived also increases as social spending rises. For every percentage point 
increase in social spending, the gap in the log-odds of protesting between the two groups 
increases by 0.03; the relatively deprived start protesting at higher levels than those who are 
less deprived at when social spending is over 21.33% of GDP (-0.64/0.03=-21.33).   
To visualise these patterns more clearly, Figures 1 and 2 plot the cross-level 
interaction effects between relative deprivation and both unemployment and social 
spending, in turn. These graphs clearly show that the effect of personal deprivation is 
amplified in contexts of high unemployment (i.e. above 5%) and in contexts where there 
are relatively higher levels of social spending as a proportion of GDP (i.e. greater than 
21.33%). We interpret both these findings in light of political opportunity structure theory: 
a situation of high unemployment opens up the political space for individual levels of 
deprivation to become understood at a more collective level and therefore to become the 
basis for political mobilisation. Similarly, for social spending, we argue that contexts where 
social spending is higher are already contexts where the opportunity structure with respect 
to protest is more open. In countries where social spending is lower neoliberal approaches 
to welfare and the individualisation of poverty and deprivation tend to be normalised. On 
the other hand, in contexts where social spending is higher there tends to be a greater 
receptivity to understanding poverty and inequality as social and political problems that can 
be redressed through collective action.  
INSERT FIGURES 1-2 
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Discussion and conclusion  
Our study shows the value of examining the cross-context conditionality of grievances and 
opportunities for individual-level protest participation. We show that individuals who feel 
that their conditions have deteriorated are more likely to take to the streets. We thus find 
evidence supporting Snow et al.’s (1998) thesis that the mismatch between current standard 
of living and expectations has some role to play for mobilising individuals, net of their 
objective economic position in society. This is an important result since it shows that when 
understood in subjective and relative terms grievances do have an impact on mobilisation. 
Linking these subjective feelings to the wider economic and political context, we find that 
not only do individual-level feelings of relative deprivation have a direct effect on the 
propensity to have protested in the last year, but that this effect is greater in contexts 
characterised by either higher unemployment rates or higher levels of social spending. We 
interpret both findings in terms of their role for opening up political opportunities for 
protest amongst those who felt a deterioration of living standards in the current crisis. 
While grievance theories and political opportunity approaches appear to be at odds with 
each other, the significant results for the cross-level interactions between relative 
deprivation and macro-level factors show that context conditions the extent of the effect of 
individual deprivation on political action. We argue that this evidence for contextual 
influences on the effect of individual-level deprivation for protest can be interpreted in 
terms of political opportunity theory. 
Both grievances and political opportunities, if specified correctly, are shown to 
contribute to our understanding of political action. Indeed, the results of this study show 
that it is their dynamic interaction which explains differential protest behaviour. More 
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specifically, our findings show that in contexts of higher unemployment, deprived 
individuals protest at higher rates than less deprived individuals. We understand higher 
levels of unemployment as providing a context where individuals are more likely to 
understand their own relative deprivation in a politicised way. For example, higher 
unemployment is more likely to become discussed as a wider social ill affecting society and 
therefore leading individuals, and particularly those who feel deprived, to become more 
likely to realise that deteriorating living standards are not just their own, individualised 
private problem, but rather a generalised, national one shared by many others in different 
forms (e.g. as loss of income, loss of employment, having to make cut backs in 
consumption etc.). In this way, a context of higher unemployment can play a role in 
politicising private lived experience, resulting in outward political action. We argue that 
individuals take cues from their wider environment and that these lead them to become 
more likely to act on their subjective feelings of deprivation by taking to the streets to 
protest government. On this reading, a visibly deteriorated economic context is understood 
as providing fertile ground for the subjective understanding of one’s deprivation as 
something that can be challenged and redressed collectively and politically. 
Our results also show that the difference between citizens who feel that their 
conditions deteriorated and those who do not, in terms of taking to the streets, are greater in 
contexts marked by higher levels of social spending. We interpret this finding by a similar 
logic. In times of crisis in particular, contexts with higher levels of social spending are 
contexts where political opportunities for protest would be perceived as more open, thus 
leading the more deprived to be being more likely to take the streets. Our results show how 
individuals in more social democratic arrangements appear to be more likely to react 
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politically when they feel that the crisis has impacted them negatively. These findings 
support the results of scholarship suggesting that welfare state provisions and citizenship 
rights represent critical resources for groups organising for collective action. While specific 
case studies have shown that the mechanism relates to the movement in question – for 
example, the mobilisation of the unemployed is linked to the extent of unemployment 
benefits (Giugni, 2008), whereas the mobilisation of immigrants is linked to the type and 
level of citizenship rights (Giugni and Passy, 2004, Koopmans et al., 2005) – here we 
generalise this finding to show that the welfare state, as captured by higher levels of social 
spending, encourages mobilisation. 
In more neoliberal contexts characterised by lower levels of social spending on the 
other hand, those who feel deprived are more likely to understand their situation in 
individualised terms and therefore to be less likely to be spurred to collective, political 
action. While both the deprived and less deprived are less likely to take to the streets in 
countries with less generous levels of social spending, citizens who feel more deprived in 
more generous welfare states are more likely to take the streets than citizens who feel less 
deprived. We suggest that this is because more generous welfare states are more receptive 
to their demands since issues relating to material deprivation are more widely understood as 
political problems needing collective solutions, not personal concerns that should be 
privately dealt with. While other studies provide some evidence that welfare states could be 
demobilising (e.g. Dodson (2015) using 2004 ISSP data), our study with data from 2015 
suggests the opposite. Further studies should explore this question in even greater detail 
and develop analyses to further disentangle which individual and aggregate level factors 
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interact with welfare state provisions to explain the individual level decision to become 
engaged in protest. 
The findings of our study emphasise the importance of examining the macro-level 
economic and political context alongside individual-level deprivation, resources, attitudes 
and networks for understanding the wider drivers of protest action. This is in line with 
previous research showing that the mobilisation of resource-poor groups is more likely 
when economic conditions have deteriorated (Baglioni et al., 2008, Piven and Cloward, 
1977). More generally, our results suggest that individuals respond rationally to the 
experience of crisis, both at the individual and aggregate level, by expressing their voice 
politically though protest. Feelings of deprivation are an important spur to the voicing of 
what could easily be seen as increasing grievances in times of crisis and we show these 
individual level influences are amplified under given contextual circumstances. Our study 
has highlighted in particular that at least in the context of economic crisis protest behaviour 
is higher amongst those individuals that have experienced a deterioration of their 
circumstances. This is net of all other characteristics that could be reasonably expected to 
foster protest behaviour at the individual level. 
At the aggregate level, we have also shown that protest is also higher in contexts 
with lower GDP growth and a higher tax wedge but these types of contexts did not amplify 
the impact of individual relative deprivation on protest behaviour. On the other hand, 
contexts characterised by greater unemployment and higher social spending levels also 
experienced higher levels of protest while at the same time also increasing the impact of 
individual level relative deprivation. Protest in times of crisis is thus shown to be more 
prevalent amongst individuals who feel deprived in contexts with higher and therefore 
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likely more politicised unemployment levels and more open political opportunity structures 
afforded by the welfare state. By extension, this means that there are more political 
responses to the crisis where the political opportunity conditions exist for the political 
expression of grievances amongst more deprived groups. On the one hand, higher levels of 
unemployment appear to lead individual problems of deprivation to become more clearly 
collectivised in the popular and political imaginary; on the other hand, higher levels of 
social spending, suggesting a greater concern for the economic welfare of citizens and 
particularly the more marginalised and more deprived groups, appear to provide the 
legitimatisation and political space for the demands of protestors in times of crisis.   
 Our study has shown that the extent to which individuals will mobilise in response 
to the negative effects of the crisis depends on experiences of deteriorating living standards 
and also the ways in which the wider environment contributes to the framing of 
opportunities (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). This further suggests that protest mobilisation is 
borne out of the complex interaction of factors at different levels in turn impacting on each 
other. Research tends to be split between those examining individual-level influences on 
protest behaviour and those examining macro-level relations. Our findings suggest that, 
besides looking for direct effects of the micro- and macro-level on protest, greater attention 
needs to be paid to their dynamic interaction for understanding the decision to become 
politically active, particularly in times of economic crisis.  
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Table 1: Variable descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Protest participation 17667 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Relative deprivation 17667 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Age 17667 44.82 14.81 18 88 
Gender (male) 17667 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Education level (less than upper secondary) 17667 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Occupation (manual) 17667 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Unemployed 17667 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Political interest  17667 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Internal political efficacy 17667 0.49 0.40 0 1 
External political efficacy 17667 0.48 0.36 0 1 
Left-right values 17667 5.24 1.84 0 10 
Libertarian-authoritarian values 17667 4.47 1.88 0 10 
Organisational memberships  17667 1.25 2.38 0 12 
Unemployment rate 2014 17667 11.93 7.75 4.5 26.5 
GDP growth 2014 17667 1.53 1.13 -0.4 3.4 
Social spending 2014 17667 25.2 3.88 19.4 31.9 
Tax wedge 2014 17667 39.83 8.47 22.3 49.3 
Relative deprivation X unemployment 17667 6.61 9.24 0 26.5 
Relative deprivation X GDP growth 17667 0.58 0.99 -0.4 3.4 
Relative deprivation X social spending 17667 11.55 12.92 0 31.9 
Relative deprivation X tax wedge 17667 18.39 20.82 0 49.3 
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Table 2: Variable distributions, by country  
 
All France Germany Greece Italy Poland Spain Sweden Switz. UK 
N 17,667 1,934 1,967 2,030 1,978 1,947 1,988 1,916 1,969 1,938 
Protest participation (%) 11.1 14.2 8.4 23.2 12.0 6.1 17.8 7.3 6.0 4.3 
Relative deprivation (%) 45.4 52.6 27.3 84.6 55.7 41.8 54.3 22.5 33.0 34.8 
Age (mean) 44.8 48.7 44.2 39.9 44.2 41.5 43.0 47.2 43.8 51.2 
Male (%)  47.2 44.1 51.9 46.7 47.5 44.5 50.1 46.0 47.2 46.8 
Education (low) (%)  24.1 28.9 17.5 13.4 32.8 15.0 38.5 26.8 18.2 25.8 
Manual occupation (%)  23.8 24.5 20.9 19.4 22.7 32.3 24.1 27.4 24.1 18.9 
Unemployed (%)  11.7 9.1 4.0 27.5 17.2 11.5 18.8 5.4 6.5 4.5 
Political interest (%) 64.3 56.3 71.0 62.9 59.9 73.7 57.7 63.9 58.4 75.5 
Internal political efficacy 0-1 (mean) .49 .39 .59 .49 .48 .51 .45 .40 .48 .66 
External political efficacy 0-1 (mean)  .48 .40 .48 .35 .57 .65 .49 .46 .44 .49 
Left-right values 0-10 (mean)  5.2 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.4 5.0 4.8 5.5 5.4 5.7 
Libertarian-authoritarian 0-10 (mean) 4.5 4.8 4.0 4.7 4.8 5.4 3.7 3.7 4.5 4.5 
Organisational memberships (0-12) (mean) 1.3 1.0 .7 1.6 2.0 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.3 .8 
Unemployment rate 2014 (%) 11.8 10.3 5.0 26.5 12.7 9.0 24.4 8.0 4.5 6.1 
GDP growth 2014 (%) 1.5 0.2 1.6 0.8 -0.4 3.4 1.4 2.3 1.9 2.6 
Social spending 2014 (%) 25.2 31.9 25.8 24 28.6 20.6 26.8 28.1 19.4 21.7 
Tax wedge 2014 (%) 39.8 48.4 49.3 40.4 48.2 35.6 40.7 42.5 22.3 31.1 
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Table 3: Multi-level logistic regression models predicting protest participation (last 12 months) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Intercept 
-2.22 
(0.20)*** 
-1.57 
(0.26)*** 
-2.36 
(0.28)*** 
-0.94 
(0.29)** 
-3.89 
(1.19)** 
-3.12 
(0.91)*** 
-2.25 
(0.28)*** 
-0.98 
(0.30)*** 
-3.54 
(1.22)** 
-2.96 
(0.92)** 
 
Micro- level           
Relative deprivation 
 
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 -0.10 0.24 -0.64 -0.25 
  
(0.06)** (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.06)** (0.11) (0.09)** (0.40) (0.32) 
Age 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Gender (male) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education (less than upper secondary)  -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
  
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Occupation (manual) 
 
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Unemployed 
 
-0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
  
(0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** 
Political interest 
 
0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
  
(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** 
Internal political efficacy 
 
0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
  
(0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** 
External political efficacy 
 
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
  
(0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)* 
Left-right values (0-10) 
 
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
  
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Libertarian-authoritarian values (0-10) 
 
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
  
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Organisational memberships (0-12) 
 
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
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Macro-level 
 
         
Unemployment rate 2014 
  
0.07 
   
0.06    
   
(0.02)*** 
   
(0.02)***    
GDP growth 2014 
   
-0.41 
  
 -0.38   
    
(0.14)** 
  
 (0.14)**   
Social spending 2014 
    
0.09 
 
  0.08  
     
(0.05)* 
 
  (0.05)+  
Tax wedge 2014 
     
0.04    0.04 
 
     
(0.02)+    (0.02) 
Cross-level interactions           
Relative deprivation X unemployment 
      
0.02    
       
(0.01)**    
Relative deprivation X GDP growth 
      
 -0.06   
       
 (0.05)   
Relative deprivation X social spending 
      
  0.03  
       
  (0.02)*  
Relative deprivation X tax wedge 
      
   0.01 
       
   (0.01) 
N groups 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
N individuals 17,667 17,667 17,667 17,667 17,667 17,667 17,667 17,667 17,667 17,667 
Sigma u 0.59 0.64 0.38 0.45 0.54 0.55 0.39 0.46 0.54 0.55 
Rho 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08 
Log Likelihood -5,877.43 -5,121.12 -5,116.57 -5,118.06 -5,119.49 -5,119.78 -5113.27 -5117.37 -5117.41 -5118.92 
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Figure 1: Plot of the cross-level interaction between relative 
deprivation and unemployment (adjusted predictions Model 7) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Plot of the cross-level interaction between relative 
deprivation and social spending (adjusted predictions Model 9) 
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